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1Online Matching and Preferences in Future
Electricity Markets
Helge S. Esch, Fabio Moret, Pierre Pinson, Andrea M. Radoszynski
Abstract—Electricity markets are to be rethought in view
of the context of deployment of distributed energy resources,
new enabling technologies and evolving business models. Fu-
ture market mechanisms should have no barrier to entry,
while being scalable and giving the possibility to accommodate
asynchronicity. Consequently, we propose here to use online
matching algorithms, relying on various types of continuous
double auctions. They allow agents to trade electricity forward
contracts while expressing preferences and being continuously
matched as new orders come. Such markets can accommodate
agents and trades of any size and characteristics. We eventually
concentrate on naive greedy and pro-rata matching algorithms.
A discrete double-auction is used as a benchmark. The double
auctions are generalized to account for preferences. A case-study
application allows us to discuss the computational properties and
optimality of the various approaches. An upper bound on the
sub-optimality of online matching algorithms, compared to an
offline double auction, is also provided.
Index Terms—Electricity markets, Peer-to-peer trading, Order
(online) matching, Greedy algorithms,
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing deployment of renewable energy sources,
combined with other distributed energy resources like stor-
age devices (e.g., electric vehicles and household batteries)
challenges the status quo in electricity markets. While the
operation of power systems has gradually considered this
evolution towards a more distributed and dynamic system,
electricity markets have not yet adapted to this new context.
However, there has been a strong push, both in academia and
industry, towards more consumer-centric structures for those
electricity markets, using community-based and peer-to-peer
concepts [1]–[3]. This may certainly have been supported by
the prospects that many see with the use of blockchain as an
enabler of new business models in the electric energy sector
[4].
Future electricity markets are to be thought as markets that
have no barrier to entry for small players like prosumers and
that operate with direct trading between sellers and buyers,
in contrast with pool approaches. For instance, peer-to-peer
electricity markets rely on large sets of bilateral contracts,
to be negotiated among all agents involved in electricity
exchange e.g. generators, consumers, prosumers and storages.
This possibly extends to having system operators in the loop in
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order to enforce operational constraints [5] and to account for
sensitivities of the next transactions to be settled on network
operation [6]. Future electricity markets may then rely on two
families of negotiation mechanisms, with various levels of
decentralization. On the one hand, distributed and consensus-
based optimization approaches generalize the clearing prin-
ciples that exist today in electricity pools [7], [8]. On the
other hand, matching methods consider networks of contracts
to be simultaneously negotiated in a multi-bilateral fashion [9].
Whatever the approach, those electricity markets allow for new
business models and for expressing preferences (related to e.g.
distance and electricity type). However, as for any type of peer-
to-peer systems, scalability and asynchronicity are some of the
key issues to be considered. This is while the optimal resource
allocation should also be analysed from a fairness based
perspective. Our main objective is to propose an approach
to future electricity markets that allows for asynchronicity,
with good scaling properties, while still allowing to express
preferences. In addition, operational constraints and network
aspects are overlooked here, though extensions towards such
considerations may build on e.g. [5], [6].
While distributed and consensus-based optimization ap-
proaches are inherently relevant for decentralized electric-
ity markets, they require substantial efforts to accommodate
scalability and asynchronicity [10]. In contrast, our proposal
involves a central matching platform: it is not as decentralized
but still relies on bilateral trades among agents. We concentrate
on matching approaches and a class of online matching
algorithms for forward contracts based on continuous double
auctions, from naive greedy (somewhat equivalent to zero-
intelligence trading) to pro-rata based approaches. These ap-
proaches inherently meet the requirements for scalability and
accommodating asynchronicity. The matching engine allows
matching buy and sell orders on the fly, also allowing to
express preferences, and with various degrees of optimality.
The price to pay, however, is some form of sub-optimality
compared to optimization approaches. One of our contribu-
tions is to give an upper bound on the optimality loss of online
matching algorithms compared to their discrete double auction
counterparts.
After describing our matching market framework, in terms
of the agents, contracts, timeline, etc. in Section II, all as-
pects of the online matching approaches are introduced and
discussed in Section III. Those include the naive greedy and
pro-rata based approaches. The optimization approach used
as a benchmark is also presented. Subsequently, particular
emphasis is placed in Section IV on the question of preferences
and how they can be handled within our online matching
framework. The case study of Section V allows us to illus-
trate the workings of the various approaches, while allowing
2to underline the advantages and drawbacks of the various
approaches. Eventually, Section VI closes the paper with a
number of conclusions and perspectives for future work.
II. MATCHING MARKET FRAMEWORK
A. Timeline
The overall market framework resembles that of intra-day
electricity markets in Europe (see [11]). A major difference
though is that, while in European electricity markets partic-
ipation is restricted to fairly large agents only (hence the
term wholesale market), access to the market is here granted
to all potential agents of the electric power system, without
minimum trade volume. Interacting through this market are
a set of agents, which may all be buyers and sellers at any
time. To discard arbitrage opportunities and potential strategic
behaviour, it is assumed that an agent does not both buy and
sell within a given trading session.
The market is then organized as a continuous double-
auction: this implies that buyers and sellers may come at any
time prior to the period of delivery with their offers, to then be
matched as they come. This contrasts with the approach in e.g.
forward wholesale electricity markets, where all supply and
demand offers are matched at once, a fairly long time before
delivery. The timeline for our matching market is illustrated
in Figure 1. The physical exchange of electricity is discretized
into delivery time periods tDi . The granularity of the market
corresponds to the duration between each delivery time period
(as for the example 5-minute resolution considered in our case
study). Exchanges, also referred to as trades, for that delivery
period tDi can be contracted forward in time throughout a
trading session running from an opening time toi and to a
closure time tci , t
c
i ≤ tDi . We write Ti = [toi , tci ] the trading
session and its duration.
Fig. 1. Market trading time and period of delivery.
In the following since we only concentrate on a given
trading session Ti for delivery period tDi and then omit i
indices, to lighten notations.
B. Orders and Limit Order Book
The matching is organized through a centralized matching
engine which market players can communicate with to submit
and cancel orders.
Definition 1 (order). An order ω(qω, pω, tsω) is fully charac-
terized by a (standing) quantity qω ∈ R, a limit price pω ∈ R+
and a submission time tsω ∈ Ti.
The limit price pω is to be understood as a minimum price
to receive if on the supply side, and a maximum price to pay
if on the demand side. The positiveness of pω is assumed
for simplicity, though this may readily be relaxed. In order
to be considered in the matching process, an order must be
submitted within the trading session, hence tsω ∈ Ti.
Buying orders β, referred to as bids, are indicated by a
negative quantity, qω < 0 while selling offers α, referred to
as asks, imply a positive quantity, qω > 0. Following the
definition of limit orders in [12], each bid is guaranteed not to
be matched at a price higher than its limit, while each ask is
guaranteed not to be matched at a price lower than its limit.
Definition 2 (Limit Order Book). At a given time t, the Limit
Order Book (often abbreviated LOB) Ls(t) consists of the
union of the set As(t) of standing asks and the set Bs(t)
of standing bids, i.e.,
Ls(t) = As(t) ∪ Bs(t), ∀t (1)
At any given time t in the limit order book Ls(t), the
difference between the highest standing bid b∗(t) and the
lowest standing ask a∗(t) defines the market (bid-ask) spread
s(t) = a∗(t)− b∗(t).
C. Matching principles
The aim of a matching engine is to pair orders ω(qω, pω, tsω)
based on their previously introduced characteristics.
Definition 3 (matching). A matching (also referred to as
trade) τ(pτ ,Ωτ , qτω) is defined by a set Ω
τ of all orders ω
involved, a vector qτω of quantities expressing the amount with
which each order ω ∈ Ωτ participates in τ , as well as a price
pτ .
Ωτ must at least hold one ask and one bid, but can possibly
be made up of multiple orders on both sides. Each ω ∈ Ωτ
receives (asks) or pays (bids) the same marginal price pτ per
involved unit e.g. kWh or MWh.
A matching is to respect limit orders, i.e., in terms of limit
prices comprising a minimum price for bids and a maximum
price for asks. In addition, in line with the basic principle of
matching supply and demand, any matching is to be balanced.
Definition 4. A matching τ(pτ ,Ωτ , qτω) is said to be balanced
when the quantities qτω involved are such that
1>qτω = 0 (2)
with 1 a vector of ones with same length as qτω .
Consequently, the power system dispatch resulting from
such matching will be consistent with the necessary supply-
demand equilibrium in power system at any time. The limit
orders considered may be partially matched: in that case, the
quantity qτω by which an order participates in a trade can be
any value in between zero and the order standing quantity
qω , qτω ∈ [0, qω]. Consequently, an order standing quantity qω
must be updated after ω is involved in a trade. It is to be seen
as a time-dependant variable which is to evolve throughout
the trading session, even though time indices will not be used
for that quantity in the following. Necessarily, the standing
quantity qω can never change its sign (a bid cannot become
an ask, as well as the opposite) and its absolute value can only
decrease over time.
3III. ONLINE MATCHING THROUGH CONTINUOUS DOUBLE
AUCTIONS
Matching may be performed following alternative prin-
ciples. Here the approaches considered all rely on double
auctions. They are described for the case of a single delivery
period of interest tDi , and thus over a trading session Ti.
While our aim is to propose online matching algorithms based
on continuous double auctions eventually, a discrete double
auction is first introduced as a benchmark. Two types of
continuous double auctions are then presented: (i) a naive
greedy approach, and (ii) a pro-rata based approach.
A. Discrete double auction as a benchmark
In the discrete case, the trading session is split into regular
time intervals of duration ∆t. Over a given time interval,
all incoming orders are collected. The limit order book is
consequently composed of both incoming orders and those
pending orders that were not matched at previous time interval
(if any). The matching τ is obtained at once at the end of
the time interval by solving a market clearing optimization
problem. The matching is only performed if the bid-ask-spread
is negative.
The market clearing problem is formulated as a linear
optimization problem, with the objective to maximize social
welfare i.e. combining the surplus of both buyers and sellers.
This reads as
max
qτω
∑
ω∈L
−qτω pω (3a)
s.t. 0 ≤ qτω ≤ qω, ∀ω ∈ As (3b)
qω ≤ qτω ≤ 0, ∀ω ∈ Bs (3c)∑
ω∈L
qτω = 0, [p
τ ] (3d)
The quantities qτω are constrained between 0 and the stand-
ing order qω for the asks, as in (3b), and between the standing
order qω and 0 for the bids, as in (3c). The balanced matching
is imposed through (3d). Solving (3) yields the set of quantities
qτω of the matching, with the set Ω
τ of matched orders
including all orders ω such that qτω 6= 0. In view of that
linear program, the equilibrium price pτ (dual variable of the
balance constraint 3d) defines the price for the trade: all sellers
(resp. buyers) are to pay (resp. receive) pτ per unit of energy
exchanged.
B. Continuous double auction: The naive greedy case
In a continuous double auction, instead of considering time
intervals, orders are matched in a continuous manner. This
means that, at any time t during the trading session, if a new
order comes and the bid-ask-spread is negative, a matching τ
will be performed.
The naive greedy algorithm is in essence similar to zero-
intelligence trading. When a new order ω comes, it is readily
matched with another order ω′ standing in a subset Lω of the
limit order book L. Lω includes all offers that are
• on the opposite side of ω (a bid for an ask, and inversely),
and
• whose price limit pω′ is feasible to be matched with ω
without a loss.
For an extensive description and discussion, see [13]. The al-
gorithm is referred to as naive since the standing offer ω′ used
for matching is randomly chosen among all standing offers in
Lω . In terms of matching outcome, one has Ωτ = {ω, ω′}.
The new order ω is considered the price taker and accepts
the limit price of the standing order ω′ that was pending in
L. ω′ is referred to as the price maker. The matching price is
then pτ = pω′ . Finally, as only two orders are involved, the
resulting trade quantities are
qτ = min{|qω|, |qω′ |} (4a)
qτω = q
τ sign(qω) (4b)
qτω′ = q
τ sign(qω′) (4c)
The standing quantities for ω and ω′ are updated after the
matching τ is executed. As long as orders have standing
quantities different from zero, they remain in the limit order
book L and may be matched at a later point in time. The
naive greedy algorithm executes further matches until either
incoming quantity reach 0, or until there are no more feasi-
ble matches available. In that latter case, it joins remaining
pending orders in L.
C. Continuous double auction: The pro-rata case
As for the naive greedy algorithm, at any time t over the
trading session, the pro-rata algorithm aims at matching an
incoming order immediately upon its arrival. For that, when
a new order ω comes, the same subset Lω of the limit order
book L is used. The main difference, however, is that standing
orders in Lω are prioritised based on their limit prices. That
is, all bids at b∗(t) or asks at a∗(t) are given priority over
orders at lower or higher prices, respectively. Consequently,
any incoming order is guaranteed to be matched at the best
available price. We write Ω′ be the set of all price-maker
orders, which has a single element in case there is only
one standing order at the best price level, and with higher
cardinality if there are multiple orders standing at the same
best price level.
The incoming order ω is the price taker and accepts the
price of the price maker(s) Ω′. Therefore, one has
pτ =
{
a∗(t), if Ω′ ⊂ A
b∗(t), if Ω′ ⊂ B , (5)
and Ωτ = {ω,Ω′}.
The cumulative traded quantity is defined as the maximum
quantity that can be exchanged. The individual trade quantities
on the maker side are then split proportionally [14]. This yields
qτ = min
{
|qω|,
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
ω′∈Ω′
qω′
∣∣∣∣∣
}
(6a)
qτω = q
τ sign(qω) (6b)
qτω′ = q
τ qω′
|∑ω′∈Ω′ qω′ | , ∀ω′ ∈ Ω′ (6c)
The standing quantities for ω and ω′ ∈ Ω′ are updated after
the matching τ is executed. As long as orders have standing
4quantities different from zero, they remain in the limit order
book L and may be matched at a later point in time. The pro-
rata algorithm executes further matches until either incoming
quantity reach 0, or until there are no more feasible matches
available. In that latter case, it joins remaining pending orders
in L.
D. Upper bound on sub-optimality gap of online matching
approaches
Matching orders in an online (causal) manner, hence using
only the information available at the time of arrival of a new
order, implies an obvious loss of optimality compared to an
offline market clearing, where all the information on orders is
considered. We refer to as offline market clearing the case of
the discrete double auction with only one time interval to col-
lect offers covering the whole trading session. It is intuitively
expected that the naive greedy matching algorithm should be
more sub-optimal than the pro-rata matching algorithm, since
orders are matched randomly. To compute an upper bound for
this sub-optimality gap, we first simplify the orders to be of
unit quantity. This does not lose generality, as each order can
be split in multiple orders at the same price level but of unit
quantity. We then define a best and a worst possible sequence
of arrivals for the social welfare to be optimized.
The social welfare is maximised, as in the offline market
clearing, when the highest bids are matched to the lowest asks
until the lowest bid-ask spread is negative. This can be readily
understood by considering than in a offline market clearing,
the equilibrium is found after ranking the bids and asks in
decreasing and increasing price order, respectively.
Definition 5 (best arrival sequence). Given a set of orders
ω ∈ L = A ∪ B with A and B the sets of all asks and bids
over the trading session, respectively, let TB be the sequence
of arrivals such that
TB = {tω|max(tsa∈A) < min(tsb∈B), tsb′ < tsb′′ if pb′ > pb′′} (7)
Then TB is one of the possible sequence of arrivals that yields
the best (optimal) social welfare.
Definition 5 implies that all asks arrive first and then all the
bids arrive in decreasing order of price. In this way, we make
sure that the bids with higher prices are matched to the asks
with lower prices until the incoming bids have lower prices
than the standing asks. The orders matched will be the same
as the ones selected from an offline algorithm, even if with a
different pricing algorithm, yielding the optimal social welfare.
With a similar approach, we identify the sequence of arrivals
that yields the worst possible social welfare, when all the asks
are standing and the bids arrive with increasing price order.
Definition 6 (worst arrival sequence). Given a set of orders
ω ∈ L = A ∪ B with A and B the sets of all asks and bids
over the trading session, respectively, let TW be the sequence
of arrivals such that
TW = {tω|max(tsa∈A) < min(tsb∈B), tsb′ < tsb′′ if pb′ < pb′′} (8)
Then TW is one of the possible sequence of arrivals that yields
the worst social welfare.
Definition 6 relies on a sequence of arrivals such that the
lowest asks are matched to the lowest bid (conditionally on
pb ≥ pa) minimizing the social welfare generated. The upper
bound of the sub-optimality gap can then be linked to the ratio
between worst and best social welfare.
Proposition 1. The sub-optimality of matching orders in an
online manner compared to an offline one is upper bounded
by
 = 1−
∫ 1
0
[
Φ−1b (x)− Φ−1a (x)
]+
dx∫ 1
0
[
Φ−1b (1− x)− Φ−1a (x)
]+
dx
(9)
where Φ−1a/b is the inverse cumulative distribution function of
the ask and bid price, respectively.
A proof of the above proposition is given in the Appendix.
One has to notice that Proposition 1 applies for continuous
cumulative distribution functions. In case of a discrete ap-
proximation, whenever Φ−1b (x) ≤ Φ−1a (x) there exist possible
matches that generate a social welfare that are not considered
in (9). Additionally, the expression of the upper bound, in
particular for the pro-rata matching algorithm, is conditional
on the probability of the sequence TW (or any other sequences
that yield to the worst social welfare) to happen. Therefore,
especially in case of large number of orders, the upper bound
in expectation can be substantially increased.
Remark 1. The upper bound Ξ of the suboptimality gap in
expectation for the pro rata algorithm is
Ξ = 1− pi
∫ 1
0
[
Φ−1b (x)− Φ−1a (x)
]+
dx∫ 1
0
[
Φ−1b (1− x)− Φ−1a (x)
]+
dx
(10)
with pi the probability of the sequence TW (or any other
sequences yielding the same matches) to happen.
As for the naive greedy algorithm, the matches yielding the
worst social welfare could happen also with other sequences
of arrivals, since the match is selected randomly among all the
feasible standing offers, increasing the value of the expected
upper bound in (10).
IV. ACCOUNTING FOR PREFERENCES
An appealing feature of consumer-centric electricity markets
is to allow expressing preferences that enter the matching
process and contribute to the price formation [8], [15]. This is
motivated by the heterogeneous views of electricity consumers
on the importance of certain attributes, e.g. type of electricity
generation source and localization [16]. We therefore general-
ize here the double auction approaches introduced previously
to also account for preferences. This is done by considering
the possibility for an order to own certain attributes and to
require attributes through the matching process.
A. Attributes and sub-markets
Preferences may be accommodated by organizing sub-
markets that bids and asks can be granted access to, if
they fit the required attributes. An attribute is defined as a
“characteristic” of electricity, that may be used as a basis
5for differentiation. Let us denote by Λ = {λj} this set of
attributes, with j = 1, . . . , nλ, where each attribute is a binary
variable, λj ∈ {0, 1}. ΛAs is a subset of attributes that can
only be owned by asks and may be required by bids (e.g.
green producer). ΛBs is a subset of attributes that can only be
owned by bids and may be required by asks, Λ = ΛAs ∪ΛBs .
In case ownership of an attribute is relevant for both bids
and asks, it must be defined in both subsets. For example, an
attribute smbus that indicates ownership of a “small business”
certificate must be defined once as smbus.ask ∈ ΛAs and in
addition as smbus.bid ∈ ΛBs .
Based on this idea, for an order ω, let Λownω be a set of
owned attributes and Λreqω a set of required attributes from a
match partner. For every ask and bid,
Λownω
{
⊆ ΛAs , ω ∈ As
⊆ ΛBs , ω ∈ Bs
, Λreqω
{
⊆ ΛBs , ω ∈ As
⊆ ΛAs , ω ∈ Bs
(11)
Taking any possible combination of the binary elements of
Λ yields a set I of 2nλ sub-markets. Each sub-market i ∈ I is
defined through exactly one tuple of binary attribute indicators
λj . A binary indicator γωi is finally introduced to indicate
whether the order ω may access sub-market i.
Remark 2. A match τ happens in exactly one sub-market i.
In order for two orders ω and ω′ to be matched, both ought
to have access to that sub-market i, hence γωi = γω′i = 1.
B. Priorities
Since each sub-market is identified through exactly one at-
tribute combination, the matching will ensure that preferences
are respected. Attributes and eventually sub-markets may be
prioritized based on a willingness to pay more (bids) or a
willingness to be paid less (asks), if a match occurs in given
sub-markets.
Definition 7 (priority-augmented order). A priority-augmented
order ω(qω, tsω,Λ
own
ω ,γω,pω) is an order additionally char-
acterized by a set of owned attributes Λownω , a vector γω of
sub-market access indicators and a vector pω of prices for all
sub-markets.
The vector γω constrains participation to certain sub-
markets and hereby require attribute ownership from a match
partner. Every sub-market an order participates in (γωi = 1),
must be given a specific price pωi. For an ask, the lower
pωi, the higher the priority for sub-market i. For a bid,
the higher pωi, the higher the priority. Different sub-markets
may be assigned with the same price in which case they
are prioritized equally. In the following, when referring to
“attribute requirement” only the highest priority is considered,
while if referring to “attribute priorities” all are considered.
C. Algorithms with priorities
Both the naive greedy and the pro-rata matching algorithms
now intend to match an incoming order in a descending man-
ner from highest to lowest prioritized sub-markets. However,
this structured prioritization only applies when an order arrives
at the matching engine and acts as a market taker. Once an
order becomes a market maker in the LOB, it is always subject
to incoming market takers. Nonetheless, the prioritization is
indirect since the order is offering better limit prices for higher
priorities.
The original market clearing optimization problem (3) is
updated with sub-market individual prices for each order.
There is now an individual trade τi clearing at pτi in each
sub-market. pτi is given by the dual variable of the balance
equations in (12b). The formulation becomes
max
qτω
∑
ω∈L
∑
i∈I
−qτiω pωi (12a)
s.t.
∑
ω∈L
qτiω = 0, [p
τi ], ∀i ∈ I (12b)∑
i∈I
qτiω ≤ qω, ∀ω ∈ As (12c)
qω ≤
∑
i∈I
qτiω , ∀ω ∈ Bs (12d)
0 ≤ qτiω ≤ qωγωi, ∀ω ∈ As, i ∈ I (12e)
qωγωi ≤ qτiω ≤ 0, ∀ω ∈ Bs, i ∈ I (12f)
It is important to note that while naive greedy and pro-rata
matching iteratively intend to match from highest to lowest
priority, the optimization problem maximizes overall social
welfare. Hence, in the optimization it could happen that an
order is matched at a lower priority in case it generates a
higher social welfare.
V. APPLICATION AND CASE-STUDY
Emphasis is placed here on an application example for a
single trading session, in order to thoroughly analyse the work-
ings of the various double auctions proposed. Since simulating
different type of offer sequences, our analysis permits to look
into the variability of the outcomes. After introducing the test
case, results are first given by taking a system-level point of
view, then followed by the agent-level one.
A. Test case characteristics
Let us consider a matching market with a resolution of 5
minutes, and with trading sessions of 5 minutes right before
the time of delivery. A single trading session in simulated
and analysed here. We define a set Λ with 5 attributes, Λ =
{smbus.bid, comkey.bid, smbus.ask, comkey.ask, green.ask}.
Here, smbus stands for an order coming from a certified
small business, green for electricity generated by renewable
energy sources and comkey is a key to identify a member of
a specific community e.g. residing in Helsingør in Denmark.
This set of attributes translates to having 32 sub-markets. An
example of a submarket would be the tuple [01011], which
can be accessed by any bid that at least owns the community
access key and any ask that comes from a green electricity
generator inside the community.
Based on this setup, a sequence of 5.000 orders for the
trading session are generated. Quantities are such that
qω ∼ 1000β(1, 3), (13)
6while 50% of all orders are bids, others are asks. 20% of
all orders own the smbus attribute (which then becomes
smbus.bid or smbus.ask depending on the type of offer),
20% of all orders own the comkey attribute (comkey.ask and
comkey.bid respectively), 50% of all asks own the green.ask
attribute.
In parallel, a limit price pinfω for the lowest priority (no
attribute requirement) for each order is generated such that
pinfω ∼
{
50 β(2, 10) + 43, ω ∈ A
50 β(10, 2) + 7, ω ∈ B , (14)
while then, for the highest priority of an order, a willingness
to pay (if ask) or willingness to accept (if bid) is added to the
above limit price, i.e.,
psupω ∼ pinfω +
{
−40 β(1, 10), ω ∈ A
40 β(1, 10), ω ∈ B , (15)
In terms of distribution of priorities, 30% of all orders
require the smbus attribute for their highest priority, 70%
of all bids require the green.ask attribute for their highest
priority, 90% of all orders that own the comkey attribute also
require it for their highest priority. For all orders, an evenly
distributed random number of priorities is generated between
the highest and lowest ones.
Three types of cases are consequently considered: a first
case without preferences with psupω as a limit price (so all
orders trade in the same sub-market without constraints), a
second case with priorities and a third case in which the
highest priority is a requirement (referred to as ”attribute
requirement”). Each simulation is run 100 times with the same
data set, but with a different and random time of arrival for
each order. Results for the discrete double auction are shown
for three clearing intervals ∆t (3s, 30s and 300s). Since the
trading session is of 5 minutes, the optimization with a 300s
clearing interval has full information of the entire order set.
It is hence expected to be the benchmark approach that will
yield the most optimal results.
B. System-level results
Let us first look at overall social welfare for the various
cases considered. Those social welfare results are gathered in
Figure 2. The results are normalized by the social welfare of
the discrete double auction with full information on the entire
order set.
For the discrete double auction case, the effect of shortening
the clearing intervals is to lower social welfare, since working
with subsets of offers over the trading session, and obtaining
matches that are less optimal than if considering the whole
order set at once. The decrease in social welfare is also
more important for the case of using attributes, with in terms
of requirement or with priorities. Generally, using attributes
here also lowers social welfare since, as for shorter clearing
intervals, leading to clearing markets with subset of offers.
Both, the pro-rata and the naive greedy algorithm yield a lower
social welfare in the priority run compared to the attribute
requirement. This could be due to the fact that lower welfare
generating matches are taking liquidity from the order book.
However, this may be impacted by the way the priorities and
prices in the test-cases were set-up.
The quantities traded through the alternative matching ap-
proaches are shown in Figure 3, where quantities are normal-
ized by the overall volume of offers in that trading session.
There, the online matching algorithms are dependent of the
arrival of orders and their instant matching. This makes
that, generally, higher volumes are traded with those online
matching algorithms, though yielding trades that will not give
the highest social welfare over the trading session. Then the
more optimal the matching is, the lower the quantities traded.
C. Agent-level results
In view of the definition of offers, the agent-level analysis
concentrates on the priority satisfaction, and prices actually
paid (or received) by those agents. Those prices are weighted
by quantities when offers get split by the matching algorithms.
The frequencies of satisfied priorities are illustrated in
Figure 4. Here, 0 indicates the highest priority. Whatever the
matching approach and clearing interval for the discrete case,
a large share of agents and offers get their first priority, and if
not their second one. Online matching algorithms are slightly
worse than the discrete one for the agents to obtain their
highest priorities. Those results may quantitatively be highly
case-dependent, though we expect this effect to be qualitatively
similar.
Finally, the distributions of prices per agent are gathered
in Figure 5. At a first glance, the spread of prices is much
higher for online matching algorithms, and especially the naive
greedy one. Without attribute and a clearing interval of 5
minutes, a unique price is obtained. This is not the case
when having smaller clearing intervals, and/or if considering
attributes (required or preferred). We expect, however, that the
price in expectation (i.e., here over the 100 replicates) to be the
same for the various matching algorithms, given the attribute
setup. This price may not be the same in expectation with the
different ways of considering, or not, attributes.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Online matching inherently possess interesting properties
for application in consumer-centric electricity markets, since
having good scaling properties, while accommodating asyn-
chronicity. Naive greedy and pro-rata matching algorithms can
also be modified to account for preferences, based on required
or preferred attributes. Despite introducing some suboptimal-
ity, those have the advantage of simplicity of implementation
and scalability over discrete double auctions based on periodic
market clearing.
It is of utmost interest to further investigate those online
matching approaches, to allow for more complicated offers
e.g. multi-period with blocks and profiles, to accommodate
some of the technical constraints of agents in electricity
markets. In addition, the implementation of online matching
algorithms should be re-thought in a decentralized fashion
to potentially suit the requirements of peer-to-peer electricity
markets. Finally, as for other electricity market types, the way
those markets interact with system operators is to be studied,
7Fig. 2. Normalized social welfare for the various matching approaches, potential consideration of attributes, a well as clearing intervals for the discrete double
auction (3s, 30s, and 300s).
Fig. 3. Normalized quantities traded through the various matching approaches,
potential consideration of attributes, a well as clearing intervals for the discrete
double auction (3s, 30s, and 300s).
so as to ensure that the dispatch obtained on the power grid
remains operationally feasible.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Let φa(p) and φb(p) be the probability density function
(pdf) of asks and bids respectively. Moving from a discrete
to a continuous domain, as the asks are all unitary, one can
build the supply curve (as in a common market clearing) as
the inverse of the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of
the ask prices Φ−1a (x), with x ∈ [0, 1]. In fact, the supply
curve is created by ordering the asks with increasing prices
and cumulatively summing the quantities. Following the same
reasoning, the demand curve can be linked to the cdf of the
bid prices Φb(p). In the case of best social welfare, the bids
arrives in decreasing order, therefore the demand curve of the
correspondent market clearing is proportional to Ψ−1b (x), with
Ψb(p) = 1 − Φb(p). In case of the worst social welfare, the
bids arrives in increasing order, therefore the demand curve of
the correspondent market clearing is proportional to Φ−1b (x).
See Figure 6 for a graphical representation of both cases.
We can therefore express the best social welfare (SWB) and
the worst social welfare (SWW ) as
SWB = M
∫ 1
0
[
Ψ−1b (x)− Φ−1a (x)
]+
dx (16)
SWW = M
∫ 1
0
[
Φ−1b (x)− Φ−1a (x)
]+
dx (17)
with M the maximum cumulative quantity used to scaling the
demand and supply function to a unitary domain and [·]+ the
positive part function. The upper bound of the suboptimality
() gap becomes
 = 1− SWW
SWB
= 1−
∫ 1
0
[
Φ−1b (x)− Φ−1a (x)
]+
dx∫ 1
0
[
Ψ−1b (x)− Φ−1a (x)
]+
dx
(18)
concluding the proof by using Ψ−1b (x) = Φ
−1
b (1− x) .
0 1
Φ−1b
Ψ−1b Φ−1a
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Fig. 6. Inverse cumulative distribution function of the ask prices Φ−1a (x),
bid prices Φ−1b (x) and bid prices yielding best social welfare Ψ
−1
b (x).
